Disillusionment with existing approaches
Questions of growth
Changing policy environments
What might make a difference
Planning the sector
Taking a global view
Entry points: When and how to start
The main impetus behind SWA is the general dissatisfaction of most stakeholders with the impact of aid on poverty reduction and the quality of life of the people in developing countries.
"Advances have not been uniform and poverty remains pervasive. We have gone forward and backward over the past 50 years."
Clare Short, 26 June 1997
There appears to be only limited correlation, if any, between prosperity, economic growth rates and human development indicators. This can be illustrated by an examination of the differences between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Human Development Index (HDI). Where the difference is positive, human development outstrips economic progress as in countries such as Tajikistan (+35), Vietnam (+26), Costa Rica (+27). However, in other countries, such as Namibia (-35), Lao PDR (-23) and Senegal (-26), prosperity has not been raised by improved education and health outcomes.
The key question is: what are the underlying causes of these differences? Possible explanations may include differences in leadership and commitment to reform, lack of accountability to civil society in delivering education services, variations in overall health and education spending volumes and poor design and appraisal of aid interventions. At a more sectoral and technical level, the causes may be differences in how policy and strategy reforms are prioritised and sequenced on variable management and implementation capabilities, including poor linkages with other sectoral developments. From a pragmatic point of view, the overriding question is: what are the key levers to pull in order to achieve long-term effective and sustainable education outcomes? And an associated question for this study is: does a SWA provide a better prospect for poverty reduction than other approaches?
The apparent absence of strong correlation between economic and human capital development is confirmed by recent studies (Asian Development Bank, 1997; Dollar and Pritchett, 1998). These indicate that initial conditions, geography and resource availability appear to be marginal compared to demographic and broader policy variables, especially sound economic management, saving rates and institutional quality [Box 1]. Pressing questions arise: are these issues being fundamentally addressed?, does an education SWA help to put these important building blocks in place?, and do education sector developments take a sufficiently long-term view when these demographic trends (especially changing dependency rates and household discretionary spending patterns) become pivotal in education policy and strategy reforms?
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Box 1 EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN GROWTH: KEY FACTORS An ADB study, Emerging Asia, analysed variables which could explain why East and South East Asia country economic growth rates have been from 2% to 3% higher per annum than those of their South Asian neighbours. This analysis, undertaken by the Harvard Development Institute, reinforces current thinking that policy/institutional/demographic factors weigh heavily in differences between economic growth rates across regions, sub-regions and countries. | |
|
Factor |
Change in Growth Rate (%) |
|
Policy Variables (Government Savings Rate, Openness, Institutional Quality) |
+2.1 |
|
Demography (Life Expectancy, Workforce Size, Population Growth) |
+0.9 |
|
Initial Conditions (GDP, Schooling) |
-0.3 |
|
Resources and Geography (Endowments, Tropics) |
-0.2 |
|
Predicted Differences |
+2.5 |
|
Actual Differences |
+2.9 |
Source: Asian Development Bank, 1997
The impetus for the shift towards various forms of education SWA appears to arise mainly from changes in the political and macro-economic environment. For example, in some African countries confidence in the political leadership and strength of macro-economic reforms is a key consideration (e.g. Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda); this reflects the findings of Dollar and Pritchett (1998), In SE Asia (e.g. Indonesia, Thailand), the 1998 economic downturn helped to create a policy environment conducive to policy-based, SWA-type reforms (e.g. Social Sector Development Programmes), led by World Bank and Asian Development Bank.
In ex-Eastern bloc countries, the withdrawal of Soviet aid provided an impetus for radical education sector structural reforms, a reflection of the unsustainability of previous systems. Recent examples include education SDPs in Mongolia and Uzbekhistan led by ADB. In some instances, political and civil reforms and relatively weak institutions (e.g. in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam) appear to have increased the impetus for radical education reforms. Paradoxically, states emerging from conflict (e.g. Cambodia, Rwanda), given positive leadership, may offer good environments for sustainable education reform programmes [Box 2]. In contrast, as Fig 2.1 shows, Governments that stay in power for too long appear to lose their capacity for successful reform, non-elected Governments performing less well than those that are elected.
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Box 2 EMERGING FROM CONFLICT: WHERE TO START? A body of experience is emerging oft how best to assist countries emerging from conflict and sodal upheaval. The broad strategy is to assure predictable macro-economic conditions as a platform for pro-poor sectoral development programmes. For example, in Cambodia the funding agency 'community' focused on strengthening financial and budget planning, development of a medium term expenditure framework and public investment programme through the Cambodia Council for Reconstruction and Development. In Rwanda DFID has provided assistance with the Public Expenditure Review focusing on the social sectors through the Ministry of Finance. It should be noted, however, that this strategy may possibly have an adverse effect on local ownership and longer-term sustainability. |
FIG 2.1: ELECTIONS, TENURE AND PROBABILITY OF SUCCESSFUL REFORM
Source: Dollar and Svensson, 1998
It is clear that to support education policy reforms requires a mix of ideas and finance. In addition, they will require countries to raise their effectiveness by implementing the principles of professionally managed Government: i.e. the development of a national plan, political will and commitment, a decentralisation policy, political accountability and sound resource management (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997).
"... we will only eliminate poverty through strong and effective states"
Clare Short, 30 June 1997
An important finding is that the factors that make a difference for overall growth seem to lie as much with central Government decisions as with sectoral Ministry interventions. Dollar and Pritchett (1998) suggest that improved education and health reforms correlate with a good policy environment that is underpinned by effective institutions and capacity building [Box 3]. The view that 'aid only works where the policy environment is sound' (Foster, 1999) challenges the received wisdom that improved social sector performance, especially in education and health, necessarily involves increased spending and/or additional aid flows. It remains to be seen whether or not SWA (or more traditional approaches) sufficiently address these issues.
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BOX 3 ASSESSING AID: OPTIMISING IMPACT · Financial aid works best in a conducive policy environment; broad growth and sectoral outcomes correlate most strongly with policy and institutional variables · Health and education outcomes do not correlate strongly with GDP sectoral shares, but rather policy commitment and institutional quality · The main value of development project assistance is to strengthen policy and commitment, alongside key institution building efforts for improved service delivery · A positive enabling environment can crowd in private investment in social sectors, bad policies crowd out participation · Commitment to policy reforms is more likely in democratically elected Governments, especially in the early years of office · Stimulating debate in civil society and information dissemination about policy is one way for development assistance to influence policy and governance reform · Project funding is not necessarily translated into increased spending on the sector, sub-sector or specified activities - money is fungible · Project success is more likely with strong beneficiary participation in planning, implementation and monitoring · Technical assistance focused on influencing policy/strategy reform and institution building has more impact than project design/planning TA |
Source: Dollar and Pritchett, 1998
Another important finding, noted in Box 3, is that effective aid can actually 'crowd-in', or encourage, private investment (including investment from the social sectors) as long as there exists an effective enabling environment (especially the establishment of quality standards and regulation and monitoring systems). In contrast, there is a danger that without such an environment, external assistance crowds out private investment, reinforcing Government's provider role. This finding argues for greater focus on institutional and governance issues, including programme designs that capture greater community/civil society participation in planning, implementation and management. A critical issue is whether an education SWA sufficiently addresses these issues, especially in the light of dramatic demographic changes projected over the next 20 - 30 years.
The challenge will be to take forward education sector development in difficult environments, usually where needs and inequities are greatest. It appears that a number of strategies may support this process. An important factor will be to identify key players willing and able to champion and influence reform, alongside offering real incentives (possibly through aid) to do so. An associated feature is a vision of long-term system change, focusing on outcomes and processes rather than on short-term activities and inputs. Often resistance to change is due to lack of knowledge about what might work. Providing opportunities for key players to share ideas with and learn from others (particularly from regional neighbours and neutral informants) builds the confidence to carry out reform.
Experience and evidence suggest that engagement of civil society in the reform process provides lasting results. However, many of the countries with the poorest social indicators have political cultures that are suspicious of private sector policy in education provision (e.g. Indo China). In others, (e.g. Rwanda, Sierra Leone), civil society has currently (early 1999) broken down, yet, paradoxically, such countries may provide real opportunities for reform. Countries with similar recent histories have often shown remarkable resilience in keeping rudimentary education services going (e.g. Cambodia, Ethiopia, Uganda), demonstrating latent community commitment and capability. Countries in which educational reform is more difficult may be those where strong, bureaucratic, regulating cultures persist (e.g. Tanzania), whose function is to protect central, organisational vested interests.
A further stimulus for the adoption of an education SWA is that it provides an opportunity for whole sector planning that ensures that broad national goals and issues such as poverty reduction, improved governance and civil service reform, decentralisation, local Government and community development, equity/gender, privatisation can be factored into and financed within a comprehensive national education framework. In many countries there has been a recent history of education planning and financing apparently stumbling from one crisis to another and where more significant issues are lost or not catered for in a systematic way.
In contrast, education SWA are underpinned by broad national goals. For example, the Uganda ESIP is predicated upon Uganda's Vision 2025 Poverty Eradication Plans. In effect this means that education planning and implementation becomes accountable in terms of equity improvement, removal of disadvantage and the raising of quality. In connection with this, it is notable that at the April 1999 ESIP Review a presentation by the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project, Perspectives on Communities on Education, 1999, was made as part of a Ministry of Finance input (an example which highlights cross-Ministerial participation, another strength of a SWA). Likewise, poverty assessment formed part of Tanzania's recent SDP appraisal (April 1999).
Returning to the concern for poverty issues raised at the beginning of this chapter: a coherently planned SWA makes it possible to ensure that education-related poverty issues such as:
· education for basic skills as a poverty reducer;
· zero and low levels of education as indicators of poverty;
· the real cost of education in relation to opportunity cost benefits;
· poverty factors (e.g. malnourishment, illness) that cause low educational attainment;
· education factors (e.g. cost to parents) that cause poverty;
· poverty as a barrier to taking up educational opportunities;
· negative returns for personal investments in education. Bird (1999)
can be addressed at a national level within the education framework.
A broader issue arises from a growing recognition that trying to improve education services in isolation is unlikely to optimise impact. Social and community cultural patterns and behaviours may create unforeseen barriers. For example, family demands on children to undertake seasonal or domestic work often undermine regular school attendance. Malaria prevalence and high incidence of diarrhoea (due to unsafe water and sanitation) are frequent causes of irregular school attendance and under-performance. Difficult terrain and absence of good roads cause erratic attendance of both pupils and teachers. These argue for a multi-sectoral approach to education development, especially integrated health and education planning, where primary school networks can be used to deliver effective 'messages' and stage interventions. A key question remains: what kind of assistance modalities can achieve these outcomes and overcome barriers most effectively? A social fund approach (Box 4) may provide a solution.
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BOX 4 SOCIAL FUNDS: A MULTI-SECTORAL MODALITY? Some Asian, South American and West African countries (e.g. Vietnam, Ecuador, Senegal) have adopted 'social funds' as a means of creating a critical mass of cross-cutting social-sector support initiatives. The majority operate on a demand-basis with small-scale health, education and water-supply initiatives identified and implemented by community groups. The role of Government is then to enable and monitor. The advantages of the social-fund approach are the broadening and deepening of implementation capability, together with direct community involvement. A potential disadvantage is weak linkage with broader sectoral and poverty alleviation frameworks unless multi-sectoral co-ordination mechanisms are established in advance. |
As with most aspects of SWA, is not yet possible to generalise when and how an education SWA should start. In practice the initial driving force appears to arise from a build up of dissatisfaction and frustration with the status quo and an agreement to re-visit education planning, including financial planning. The trigger for a clear movement towards a SWA is almost invariably a political decision requiring strong national leadership and understanding at ministerial level or higher.
What is clear is that after the decision is taken, start-up and continuation depend on a number of issues:
· political acceptability and commitment;
· positive macro-level financial conditions;
· sector level financing, particularly recurrent budget mechanisms;
· resource identification, needs and utilisation;
· identification of stakeholders and partnership arrangements;
· management arrangements;
· institutional strengthening and capacity building.
It will be observed that these are mostly general issues of institutional process: issues that are not specifically educational in nature. One of the aims of the following chapters is to illuminate this process within the education context. Start-up issues are further discussed in Chapter 6.
