Historical perspectives
Enabling national ownership/leadership
Community consultation
Analysis of policy and strategy requirements
Design and planning structures: Strengths and limitations
Institutional reform and capacity building
SWA and decentralisation
Strengthening SWA finance/budget planning
Strengthening financial management/tracking systems
SWA implementation: Management structures
SWA: Changing organisation/management cultures
Performance monitoring/evaluation system development
Some lessons learned
It bears re-emphasis that education SWA in the context of this study 1 are in their infancy. Documentation review suggests that of countries currently receiving external support to education, there are about 25 - 30 instances of SWA (e.g. SDPs/SIPs), mainly in Africa and Asia. The experience recorded in recent reviews suggests that the design and planning phase of a SWA type sector support programme can take two to three years. As a result, virtually all of the present examples and case studies are in the design/planning phase. There is therefore little experience of actual implementation of education SWA. The lessons learned and case study reviews therefore largely focus on design and planning issues. Where possible, potential implications for management and monitoring of the implementation phase will be highlighted.
1 In richer countries, education development generally evolves through a sector wide approach controlled by principles of good governance, transparency and accountability. Penrose (1998) also reminds us that there are many examples of international provision of programme aid (characterised by budget and balance of payments support) that predate project aid. Therefore, to argue for a SWA is to argue for practices that have been and still are in operation in many places.
A lesson emerging from SWA development is the critical importance of national Governments owning and leading the process, alongside well-articulated sector policies/strategies and adequate programme management capabilities. Strong personal engagement of senior officials (e.g. Minister of Education, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Local Government) is an absolutely necessary ingredient. Education ministry leadership, without finance ministries' support, appears insufficient, especially in situations where there is regular turnover of ministers of education.
Preliminary evidence suggests that to date the level of ownership and leadership in ESDP/ESIP development has been variable. In some countries (e.g. Ethiopia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Uganda), leadership has been reportedly strong. In others, leadership has been more patchy (e.g. Ghana, Nepal, Tanzania), due in part, to lack of real commitment to reform and changes in top management. Sometimes the need to convince the leadership of reform has created a slowdown in implementation. Nevertheless, in the long term, strong commitment should benefit effective programme implementation.
Experience indicates that it is worth waiting for senior management to internalise the SWA process before rushing to acceptance and/or implementation [Box 28]. There are dangers for national ownership and leadership if this is not done [Box 29]. There may also be risks to ownership and national commitment from high volumes of external technical assistance during SWA design and development.
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BOX 28 INTERNALISING THE SWA PROCESS The Uganda ESIP was developed over a period of eighteen months from May 1997 to November 1998 by Senior Ministry planning officers in wide-ranging discussion and collaboration with Governmental and non-Governmental stakeholders. Towards the end of this period it was decided to call a retreat with funding agencies; a meeting of Top Management was called to discuss preparations. The meeting included several prominent but very recently appointed actors: the Minister of Education, two Ministers of State and the Permanent Secretary. It was quickly realised that the Ministry would not present itself well to external agencies until it had 'internalised' ESIP, so, under instructions torn the Minister, members of Top Management were instructed to read, understand and thereby own the policy framework. This quickly took place and the internalisation process is now seen as a turning point in taking forward ESIP. The word 'internalise' has now become part of the lexicon at senior levels in the Ministry. |
Several lessons can be learned on nurturing leadership and commitment. Firstly, informing senior leadership of the benefits of reform and successes elsewhere (e.g. via EU Horizon 2000 Consultations, African Ministers of Education Meetings) can reinforce commitment and understanding. Secondly, information exchange via regional political/policy networks (e.g. regional development banks, UN and other multilateral organisations) could be nurtured. Thirdly, it is critical that funding agencies nurture trust at senior Government levels and avoid perceptions of 'crowding' Government, especially bilateral agencies that rightly or wrongly are often perceived as having particular agendas.
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BOX 29 TANZANIA ESDP: LOST LEADERSHIP? In 1996 and 1997 the Tanzania ESDP showed signs of being a strong case study for Government-funding agency partnership processes. A common SOP work programme was designed and jointly endorsed at a 1997 conference. Following a pre-appraisal exercise in early 1998, many funding agencies signed up to a SOP partnership paper outlining the rules of engagement. Twelve months later, implementation has yet to begin. What went wrong? Evidence points to uncertain ownership and leadership within the education ministry. The Ministers involvement had been intermittent with limited funding agency engagement. Government-funding agency meetings were often chaired by mid-level technical staff. Consistency in leadership was undermined by turnover in policy-making staff. Potential champions of reform were increasingly marginalised as vested interests recognised the impact of reform. Hard decisions on teaching service rationalisation, secondary education financing and standards setting and regulation were sidelined. Lack of internalisation and engagement has been compounded by a "parallel" SDP planning/management process which largely marginalised line directorates. |
It is generally the case that SWA planning and design have mostly arisen from negotiation and planning at central levels, involving key central players. In several instances, it is reported that ownership and understanding at lower levels (e.g. regional authorities in Ethiopia, district/community groups under Tanzania ESDP, Pakistan SAP, Cambodia ESIP) is limited. In Mozambique ESSP and Uganda ESIP, community consultation has been slightly more extensive. Nevertheless, many NGOs and other community based organisations (CBO) have commented that the SWA seems to be driving them out; this often seems to be the case at planning stage. Whether or not these limitations will be overcome at the implementation stage remains to be seen. On a more positive note, there does appear to be increased consultation with NGOs/CBOs during country programming missions (e.g. ADB, DFID, World Bank) and a growing tendency to place NGO coordinators in agency field offices (e.g. DFID, East Africa).
Without wider consultation, there is a danger that the views of key stakeholders will be missed, critical barriers to service delivery overlooked and opportunities to 'crowd in' community and other NGO providers missed. There is certainly scope for CBO and NGO participation during SWA implementation. One necessary action is to include community mobilisation and effective information exchange (e.g. community meetings, newsletters, etc.) at the design stage [Box 28]. This was an early feature in Tanzania but was not followed through [c.f. Box 27].
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BOX 30 SWA TO EDUCATION: COMMUNITY CONSULTATION AND RESEARCH Do ESDP plans reflect the real priorities of community groups, especially disadvantaged groups? The conventional wisdom that poor communities value education as a vehicle for poverty alleviation can be challenged. Community consultation and participatory research can help illuminate key issues: · What are the key barriers to access to education services facing specific groups? |
Source: Norton and Bird, 1998
At the risk of oversimplifying what happens in practice, it is possible to divide the policy and strategic planning processes and outcomes in SWA into two broad categories. One approach, typically evolutionary and flexible, (e.g. Pakistan SAP, Thailand/Indonesia SSDP, Uganda ESIP) focuses on setting broad policy and strategic targets with strong linkage to resource envelopes and the budget process. A second approach, based on a blueprint design, is perhaps more suited to a sub-sectoral programme (e.g. Nepal ESIP) and essentially treats the sector or subsector as a project with pre-defined activities and inputs. The latter appears to leave less scope for evolution and adjustment of policy and strategy and undermines the case for flexible budgetary support instruments.
In practice, however, as was argued in Chapter 3, many SWA have characteristics of both the evolutionary and blueprint approaches (e.g. Ethiopia ESDP). It is therefore probably too early in the development of SWA to attempt any rigid classification of approaches; indeed, as countries develop their own contingency models, such a classification is probably unnecessary.
A broad feature of many of the ESDPs/ESIPs is the absence of a long-term strategic vision, e.g. to consider processes and targets beyond the achievement of UPE. There are certain dangers in having no long-term ESDP perspective plan. In particular:
· long-term financing implications over a 10-20 year period are rarely addressed;· reduction of any incentive to examine long-term resource utilisation strategies (e.g. teacher/classroom deployment policies);
· reinforcement of a tendency to set unrealistic policy goals and time frames;
· budgets tend to be based on incremental changes derived from historic patterns.
The critical lesson to be learned is to invest greater time and effort in formulating a sustainable policy and strategic framework, taking account of long term projections of available resources and proposed institutional changes. This argues for greater policy and strategic dialogue at design stage, including clear priority setting, clear definition of anticipated long-term outcomes, clear sequencing and, most importantly, avoidance of a restrictive blueprint. With regard to the latter point, there is a danger that a blueprint approach will reinforce a tendency to focus on short-term improvements (which may not be sustainable) and input accounting, rather than output audit. In essence, a rigid short timeframe blueprint approach (characterised by formulation of master plans, rather than strategic frameworks) could end up reinventing the project approach in a different guise.
Box 31 contains perspectives on some of the concerns expressed in the preceding paragraphs.
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BOX 31 SWA POLICY AND STRATEGY · "Focus on vision not blueprint; policy and programme need to evolve with a clear link between strategy, resources and budget process." · "Need for sound Ministry of Education/Ministry of Finance dialogue on medium-term expenditure frameworks and forward budget plans." · "Concern that World Bank disbursement processes and blueprint design are dictating the SWA process." · "Don't look at educational issues in isolation; education needs to fit within the broader public expenditure review framework". · "We need to encourage a long-term strategic view, including closer co-operation between MoE and Planning/Finance Ministries" · "We need to think in terms of the global situation, a 30-year time frame and to answer the question, 'Where do we want to be in 10 years time?'" · "Greater attention needed to cost analysis in SWA, including clear definition of the role of Government, communities and funding agencies in financing services" · "Too much attention to resource shifts (e.g. salary/non-salary, primary/tertiary), too little attention to service delivery constraints and incentives" |
Source: Interviews with DFID Advisers, October 1998
One fundamental issue concerns the most effective management systems for both SWA design and its implementation. A number of approaches have been adopted. One response has been to form parallel management systems for the design phase 2 (e.g. sector management teams, Tanzania; technical working groups, Uganda, programme management unit, Cambodia, etc.). This has been normally linked to various forms of steering committees and review groups. A second approach (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nepal, Zambia, and, more recently, Uganda) has been to integrate ESDP/ESIP planning (and implementation) processes into the regular, routine functions of the MoE. This leads to a more effective way of working, particularly during implementation.
2 Note: These parallel management systems should not be confused with the Education Sector Co-ordinating Committee (Fig 4.1) which plays a central co-ordinating role for the various stakeholders involved (Ministries, NGOs, Funding Agencies).
A common outcome of the first approach has been lack of ownership and commitment within line MoE directorates and lack of effective linkages with finance and local Government ministries planning structure. Line directorates can feel marginalised and become resistant to change, unless there is strong senior leadership. A second common outcome has been a tendency to proliferate parallel staff incentive packages, similar to PIU arrangements. The second approach appears to be more effective in ensuring broad ownership of the ESDP/ESIP planning process as long as the respective planning directorates and management groups are not overloaded by additional work.
The broad lesson learned is that SWA design/planning processes need to be institutionalised within existing organisational structures. To be most effective, there needs to be a clear delineation between long-term strategic planning and day-to-day operational planning within line directorates. The challenge will be to reorient line directorates (e.g. primary, secondary, etc.) to see planning rather than management and administration as a core function. A second challenge will be to avoid strategic planning units being relegated to short-term project or programme planning and administration functions.
A second lesson to be learned is that far greater attention needs to be paid to integrating MoE organisational reforms (including planning and design functions) into broader civil service reform (CSR) programmes. CSR initiatives, especially encouraging line ministries to focus on policy and monitoring functions rather than traditional management and administration, can provide the impetus for necessary planning reforms. A broad characteristic (e.g. in Zambia, Tanzania) has been significant education ministry resistance to central organisational change. Alternatively, even where changes have been agreed as necessary, unforeseen delays can arise from putting them into operation (e.g. ministry restructuring in Uganda).
International development experience suggests there are always dangers in creating new institutional structures in order to manage and implement reforms effectively. This is as much a concern in ESDPs/ESIPs as in project or programme aid approaches. In order to avoid dangers of organisational duplication or replication, it is critical that institutional reform and capacity building objectives, targets and processes are built in to the design and planning stage of education SWA, including strong linkages with local Government reform programmes.
In terms of SWA, institutional development needs to focus on three main issues:
1) Government capacity to lead the sector development processes, including strategic analysis and budgetary/financial analysis;2) The creation of structures, systems and incentives in both public and private sectors, to manage and deliver education services;
3) The establishment of management systems, both within Government and funding agencies, which facilitate common management systems, through Government processes and procedures.
The review of ESDPs/ESIPs gives a somewhat mixed picture on these institutional/capacity-building considerations. In some cases (e.g. Tanzania ESDP, Uganda ESIP, Ghana ESDP), capacity building plans appear central to the overall reform process. In other cases (e.g. Ethiopia ESDP, Pakistan SAP, Nepal/Zambia ESDP), capacity building objectives and strategies are less clear. The lack of clarity is due in part to a lack of consensus between Governments and funding agencies on the extent to which Government systems (particularly financial management/reporting/audit) can be trusted. A second constraint arises out of uncertainties over the longer-term directions of public/private partnerships in the financing and management of services, particularly for secondary and higher education. A third constraint is lack of clarity on a stratagem for effectively involving civil society in the planning and management of sector reform programmes.
The critical lesson learned is that institutional development and capacity building need to be central to SWA planning and design; it should not be an afterthought. In particular, Governments and funding agencies need to agree on the broad guiding principles and policies of SWA institutional development and to take a broad comprehensive view, beyond simply organisational re-equipping and staff training [Box 32]. Institutional development and capacity building targets and outcomes need to be incorporated into SWA planning, alongside the traditional setting of education access, quality and efficiency objectives and targets.
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BOX 32 CAPACITY BUILDING IN SWA: SOME GUIDING PRINCIPLES · Negotiated agreement on building up and trusting in Government's own systems, including any necessary interim measures and time frames · Clearly specified levels of delegated authority at central and lower levels of the system, including associated capacity building measures · A greater focus on organisational processes and information flow systems, rather than simply organisational restructuring and re-equipping · Clear plans for organisational and individual reward and incentive systems, linked to broader civil service reform policies · Setting of clear capacity building targets and outcomes linked to agreed mechanisms for their regulation, management and monitoring · Making standard setting and regulatory and quality assurance frameworks central to capacity building and broader governance development |
Source: derived from Cassels, 1997 and EU Horizon 2000, 1997
A third lesson is that pro-active mechanisms need to be established to ensure that institutional reforms remain central to SWA planning. It also needs to be recognised that education ministries alone cannot implement many essential policy and institutional arrangements (e.g. managerial decentralisation, accounting reforms, and staff incentives). Ensuring that these institutional reforms are supported by other parts of Government is critical to the SWA design and appraisal process. Accordingly, existing steering and management committees (e.g. central steering committees, Ethiopia ESDP, education sector co-ordination committee, Tanzania ESDP, Mozambique ESSP) need to be not only broadly representational but also proactive in addressing and managing crosscutting institutional reforms. Strengthening the capacity of these inter-ministerial steering committees is critical for SWA institutional reform objectives.
In many of the countries adopting education SWA, various forms of decentralisation are in process. In larger federal countries (e.g. Pakistan, India, Ethiopia), this amounts to direct political decentralisation. In smaller countries (e.g. Tanzania, Uganda), managerial decentralisation is ongoing. A potential difficulty is that block grants to lower levels of the system may not be allocated according to proposed SWA priorities. At the same time (e.g. in Ethiopia ESDP), central earmarking of funds and by-passing middle levels of Government (e.g. states in a federal system) makes sector-wide planning problematic and potentially undermines local autonomy.
The solution may lie in negotiated agreements (including poverty and needs-linked resource allocation formulae) between central and local authorities. A second solution may be early design and start-up of financial channelling and tracking systems (linked to a combination of conditional and unconditional grants) acceptable to both Government funding agency authorities. A critical debate is whether funding agency assistance for capacity building, often with large technical co-operation (TC) inputs for local Government reform initiatives, should be located in the education ministry or Local Government ministry as a support component for education SWA. An associated issue is whether technical assistance funds should be channelled through Government systems, with appropriate earmarking at regional/provincial/district levels. Box 33 indicates other possibilities that are currently in operation.
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BOX 33 POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO SWA/DECENTRALISATION CONCERNS · Earmarking funding agency support programmes, both recurrent/development, channelled through finance ministries (e.g. Channel I/II Ethiopia ESDP) · Setting up systems of conditional recurrent/development grants (e.g. Uganda ESIP) · Establishing effective negotiation mechanisms between federal/regional and regional/provincial levels for block grant allocation (e.g. Vietnam) · Negotiating poverty and performance/needs based regional/provincial resource allocation formulae (e.g. Ethiopia, Vietnam, Tanzania) · Establishing regional/provincial/district managed capacity building funds, channelled through) central ministries (e.g. Indonesia SSDP) · Channelling capacity building funds direct to lower levels, outside the Government budget, essentially as a traditional TA project/programme |
Source: based on Cassels, 1997, EU Horizon 2000, 1997, Gould et al, 1998
A major weakness of many sector-wide developments has been the absence of a clear medium term expenditure framework (MTEF), including education-spending projections. This situation is often exacerbated when finance ministries and funding agencies are reluctant to make long-term financial commitments. A further complication arises if levels of support are directly related to sector performance. Informants pointed to the lack of clear linkage between SWA strategy, resource availability and the budget process as a primary fundamental concern. Recent PER exercises (e.g. Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda) reflect these concerns [Box 34]. In contrast, in countries where SWA are beginning to be implemented successfully (Ghana and Uganda), the MTEF is central to the process.
The critical lesson learned is that ESDP/ESIP financial planning cannot be conducted in isolation. A key constraint on improved finance/budget planning is the frequent absence of high-level finance/budget analysis and planning capacity within both finance and education ministries. This situation is exacerbated in federal states where such capabilities at regional/provincial levels tend to be weaker. In education ministries in particular, these limitations undermine effective advocacy and dialogues with finance ministries.
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BOX 34 PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEWS | ||
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"If Government has no effective framework that establishes consistency between its stated sector policies and the medium term strategy for public expenditure, the commitments regarding future financing of the sector lack any solid foundation [...] Overall budget strategy becomes driven more by funding agency reaction to shortfalls in counterpart funding commitments than by any long-term view." [Tanzania PER, 1998] |
"There remains the need for better co-ordination and synchronisation of the ongoing activities by the authorities on the implementation of a medium-term expenditure framework, public investment programme and the sector development programmes [...]. The role of increased private sector participation in the SDP sectors need to be assessed on a continuing basis." [Review of Public Finances, Ethiopia. 1998] |
"Budget and release of funds will be in line with the rolling medium-term expenditure framework, maintaining a minimum 31% of recurrent discretionary expenditure for the education sector over 1998-2003 [...], extending the rolling MTBF and work plan to cover all development spending in line with the framework and sector work plan." [Government of Uganda undertakings, ESIP, 1998] |
A fundamental question is how can funding agencies best support improved finance planning within an SWA? One strategy (growing in frequency) is active support for and participation in annual Public Expenditure Review (PER) exercises. Effective examples of this approach include Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda and Rwanda PER exercises in 1998/99. A second strategy is the active nurturing of finance ministry participation in ESDP/ESIP inter-ministerial planning and steering committees [Box 35]. Where accepted by Governments, a complementary approach is early capacity building (possibly via technical assistance) for education ministries. This may be complemented by short-term technical assistance (with an education brief) with the finance ministry itself.
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BOX 35 LINKAGES: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION - MINISTRY OF FINANCE Planning processes increasingly recognise the importance of joint education finance ministry partnerships in SWA. One mechanism is to provide support for the annual PER exercise, Recent examples where this has been done include Tanzania/Uganda 1998, Rwanda, 1998 and Ghana/Ethiopia 1998. As a Minister of Education recognises: "Although broad involvement has been a feature of the development of ESIP, In reality the success of the programme will very much depend on how well Government performs in the financing and budgeting arena. Thus, one of the most important partnerships is actually an inter-sectoral one: that between the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development and Ministry of Education and Sports." Professor A Nsibambi, Minister of Education and Sports, Uganda |
On a broader front, evidence and experience suggests that the strategic linkage between education sector planning and broader poverty alleviation strategies is, at best, tenuous. In most of the ESDP/ESIP documents, poverty/education linkages are implicit rather than explicit. There is an implied assumption that focusing on resource shifts (e.g. increased basic education spending shares) may be sufficient. There is growing evidence (e.g. Dollar and Pritchett, 1998) that social sector spending volumes do not correlate strongly with improved poverty reduction and sectoral outcomes.
How can funding agencies best assist in securing effective linkage between education SWA and broader poverty eradication plans? One strategy is to support the redesign of poverty assessments so that they focus on poverty-related constraints to equitable access and quality in education service delivery. A second thrust might be support for more analytical work on poverty-indexed resource allocations and impact monitoring.
Further analytical work is needed on a number of SWA/poverty issues. Firstly, can discrete poverty-focused programmes/projects for disadvantaged groups be reconciled within an education SWA? Secondly, if technical assistance is required is it best located within education ministries or elsewhere (e.g. planning commissions, poverty units)?
A pure education SWA is fundamentally predicated on the assumption that funding agency support will be pooled and channelled through Government financial management systems. The reality and practice in current ESDP/ESIP plans is that many funding agencies do not consider Government financial management and reporting systems sufficiently robust. As a result, a number of hybrid systems have emerged. The danger is that if these parallel financial management systems are prolonged, the Government's own systems will be drained of capacity and the incentives to strengthen Government financial systems will wane.
A number of compromises are currently in operation. Under the Ethiopia ESDP, there is a three-channel system (through MoF, through MoE and direct) with various degrees of earmarking. Another compromise is to restrict budget support to basic education only (e.g. BESIP, Nepal) with other sub-sectors funded through project modalities. Also in Nepal funding agencies are financing a percentage of support through Government systems (the rest through projects) in order to test the robustness of the system. In Ghana, some funding agencies give project funds: EC gives structural adjustment support while DFID provides finances through budgeted systems. In the Mozambique ESSP, a number of funding agencies are providing budget support with varying degrees of earmarking. In Uganda one purpose of the first review of ESIP performance (April 1999) was to propose the drawing up of a single set of undertakings to which Government and all budget-supporting funding agencies will sign up to, while Government maintains commitment to ongoing projects during transition.
Whilst appreciating funding agency concerns over financial accountability and audit, continuation of a proliferation of financial management systems raises a number of concerns. Earmarking support for activities undermines Government ownership and decision making and essentially amounts to a set of co-ordinated projects rather than an SDP. In addition, earmarking continues the prevalence of funding agency attribution to activities and inputs, rather than shared Government/funding agency responsibility for achieving sectoral objectives and outcomes. It bears re-emphasis that various financial routes/channels reduce financial flexibility (undermining the basis of flexible budgetary support), increase the administrative overload and are inherently capacity draining.
This continued funding agency concern over financial management matters perhaps makes too much over the issue of fungibility. There appears to be little correlation between earmarking education support and actual increased spending on the sector. In addition, improved sectoral outcomes are often more strongly correlated with Government commitment to reform than with targeting/earmarking education aid. Also, improved education outcomes appear to depend more on the quality and effectiveness of spending than on overall quantity. All aid is fungible, whether given as projects or as sector wide budget support [Box 36].
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BOX 36 FUNGIBILITY: ARE FUNDING AGENCIES LOOKING THE WRONG WAY? "Funding agencies should lake it for granted that their financing is fungible because that is reality." "Fungibility is an issue only if the objectives of funding agencies and recipients are different." "Funding agencies must form an opinion on the allocation and effectiveness of a country's public spending." |
Source: Dollar and Pritchett, 1998
In the medium to long-term, there is strong case (e.g. as in Uganda, ESIP, Thailand/Indonesia, SSDP, Pakistan SAP) for showing trust in and commitment to using Government fiscal channels. A critical issue here is the inclusion of financial management and reporting capacity building as a central part of programme design. DANIDA support for financial accounting (under Nepal ESIP) is a good example. A second issue is the introduction of regular monitoring-review of overall and sectoral expenditure patterns against agreed broad guidelines. These guidelines, which frequently appear in SWA literature [Box 37], should be jointly negotiated within clear financing formulae and information exchange systems.
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BOX 37 SWA TO EDUCATION: DEVELOPING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT CAPACITY · Early funding agency commitment to use Government financial management channels, alongside agreed time frames for phasing out alternative routes · Agreements on broad and sectoral expenditure patterns linked to clear guidelines and financing formulae · Minimising subsequent departures from agreed budgetary allocations, alongside effective contingency planning for revenue shortfalls · Early implementation of capacity building plans for financial management and reporting · Negotiated agreements on timeliness of financial reports and independent financial audit mechanisms · Review and reform of funding agency financial management/audit systems, consistent with jointly agreed financial channelling/management reforms |
Source: extracted from EU Horizon 2000, 1997, Gould, Takala, Nokkala, 1998
Many of the education SWA remain at the planning or pre-implementation stage. It is therefore premature to draw many firm lessons on appropriate and effective management arrangement structures for SWA implementation. Early signs suggest that agreeing common management structures will be a central issue [Boxes 38 39]. The emphasis to date has been on trying to harmonise funding agency procedures. Noonan (1997) highlights the divergence between funding agency statements and practice, especially regarding financial management and accounting. Another issue is that of attribution: the need, often for 'back home' political purposes, for funding agencies to be clearly associated with particular inputs/activities and outcomes. Although widely quoted as an issue, funding agencies seem to be polarised on this, some (GTZ, CIDA) using it as an argument to fuel broad concerns with the SWA, others not seeing it as a problem: "Which is better: we constructed five schools, or we developed the whole sector?" [Asko Luukkainen, Director for Sector Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki].
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BOX 38 PROPOSED BESIP MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES, ZAMBIA · Joint Steering Committee Meeting: Meetings quarterly. Chaired by the Minister of Education, other participants: funding agency representatives, team leaders and a management team. Subject to produce bi-annual reviews. · Joint Programme Development and Implementation Monitoring Committee: Meetings monthly. Chaired by PS, other participants: funding agency representatives, team leaders and management team. · Ministry Senior Management Group: Meetings bi-monthly. Chaired by PS. · Interim BESIP Management Team: Chaired by DPS, other participants: head of finance and projects section, planning and research officer, technical assistance. Functions: finance and budget, advisory, decision making, project supervision and development, funding agency co-ordination, manage decentralisation, monitoring and evaluation, preparation of reports, liaise with planning/research. |
Source: Gould, Takala and Nokkala, 1998
As with financial management, SWA should be predicated on the use of Government management systems. The above-mentioned concerns, combined with the existence of various funding agency-financed project/programme units during transition towards SWA, can create difficulties in resolving management issues. Various management strategies are being used. In the education SWA of Mozambique, Uganda, Ghana and Zambia, management is to be conducted through normal, education ministry management-organisational structures [Boxes 38, 39]. In other cases (e.g. Tanzania, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand), stand-alone 'super' PIUs/PMUs are being considered or are in place. These are normally extensions from the earlier planning/design phase and are often a funding agency response to the perceived weaknesses of ministries' management systems.
In the longer-term, the use of strengthened education ministry management systems is critical. Continuation of 'super' PMUs will be capacity draining and may undermine ownership by line directorates, which feel marginalised by them. The critical issue will be to negotiate common country-specific, SWA management solutions between Governments and funding agencies. These solutions will need to include a clear timeframe for incorporating existing project units into an agreed structure and a well-designed, management capacity building programme.
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BOX 39 JOINT STATEMENT ON COMMON PROCEDURES FOR THE MOZAMBIQUE ESSP "To facilitate timely and efficient implementation of the programme, it will be implemented using Government procedures and management structures, where these are acceptable to funding agencies. In cases where the systems are not acceptable or where the effectiveness of the system is constrained by weak institutional capacity, funding agencies are willing to work with the Ministry to correct the problem. The attainment of common implementation procedures should be looked upon as a process and should not be forced. Should the use of Government procedures prove successful, all funding agencies would be encouraged to use them." |
Source: Five-Year Education Sector Strategy Plan for Mozambique, 1998
Accepting the principle of using Government management structures does not imply that the existing management processes and organisational culture will be necessarily effective in implementing education SWA. The purer, more evolutionary SWA (as opposed to the blueprint SIP approach) creates a more uncertain planning environment. The somewhat bureaucratic, top-down management processes (which exist in Governments and funding agencies alike) will become increasingly inappropriate for SWA. The more adaptive SDPs (e.g. Uganda, Ghana, Indonesia, and Pakistan) will demand more adaptive, participatory and organic processes and structures (see Box 40).
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BOX 40 SWA TO EDUCATION: ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT CULTURES | ||
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|
Mechanistic (blueprint) |
Adaptive (evolving) |
|
Environment/Tasks |
Certain/routine |
Uncertain/innovative |
|
Planning |
Comprehensive |
Incremental |
|
Decision making |
Centralised |
Decentralised |
|
Leadership style |
Command |
Participatory |
|
Communication |
Vertical/formal |
Interactive/informal |
|
Staffing basis |
Functions |
Objectives |
|
Structures |
Power |
Knowledge |
|
Staff capacity |
Low tolerance of uncertainty/change |
High tolerance of uncertainty/change |
Source: Middleton et al, 1987
An historical review of ESIP/ESDP planning histories suggests that systematic assessment of management cultures is a somewhat neglected area. There is an assumption that innovative reforms can somehow be bolted on to existing bureaucracies. Particularly in bureaucracies with a long tradition of command/control (e.g. Cambodia, Tanzania), this has proved extremely problematic, especially at pre-implementation stage where the implications for individual power and influence become more apparent. There is a strong case, especially in evolutionary SWA type programmes to undertake an extensive change management assessment and process (as a central part of capacity building) in advance of implementation. This is recognised by many funding agencies, including World Bank [Box 40].
A major difference between SWA and traditional project/programme aid approaches is that the former places far greater emphasis on the monitoring/audit of outcomes and objectives as opposed to accounting for inputs and activities. An effective education SWA is predicated upon an agreed set of performance indicators and an adequate EMIS and monitoring and evaluation system. Experience suggests that monitoring needs to be kept simple and restricted to key indicators. Simultaneously, the performance indicators need to be comprehensive, including measures of legislative/regulatory, capacity building, and service quality and efficiency gains. Monitoring systems need to be broad, including scope for independent audit, beneficiary assessment and cross checking.
Ongoing ESDPs/ESIPs show these broad features. In the Ethiopia ESDP, there are around twelve indicators focusing on access, quality, efficiency and budget shares. The Tanzania ESDP is similar but incorporates some management development indicators. Various BESIPS (e.g. Nepal, Zambia) focus on similar system performance indicators. A broad review of other sectoral and sub-sectoral ESDPs (e.g. Cambodia, Bangladesh, Belize, and Vanuatu, Malawi), adopt a similar format whereby performance targets at the end of a five-year period are specified with measurable indicators and verification measures. The Uganda ESIP and to some extent, Ghana ESDP and Mozambique ESSP adopt a different approach whereby performance indicators are reviewed and agreed on an annual basis, as part of the annual joint review process.
These two distinct approaches to performance monitoring reflect the broad distinction between the more mechanistic blueprint approach and the adaptive evolutionary mechanisms. A potential advantage of the adaptive approach (especially when release of both Government/funding agency development spending is dependent upon achieving performance targets) is that there is a far greater incentive for both effective monitoring data collection and system development. The blueprint approach (where aid tranching is less prevalent) provides far less incentive for monitoring system development and implementation. There is a danger in the latter that plans and targets become 'cast in stone' undermining incentives for strategic review and revision of targets according to changing circumstances. It can also be argued that monitoring and evaluation are too important to be left to planners [Box 41].
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BOX 41 SWA PERFORMANCE MONITORING: SUSTAINABLE INSTITUTIONS A clear tendency is to locate a small monitoring capability within the education Planning Unit doing little more than analysis and collation of routine data How can the scope be broadened and monitoring institutionalised? The case of Papua New Guinea provides useful pointers. In the early 1980's PNG embarked on a comprehensive sector reform programme. The need to institutionalise sector performance monitoring was recognised early. In 1992, the education ministry established a standing task force of very senior technical staff as an implementation Monitoring Group (IMG). The IMG, with multi-funding agency support, is responsible for preparing quarterly and annual performance reports for the Minister, drawing on the existing EMIS and special surveys and studies. The IMG is still functioning effectively in 1999. |
Source: ADB, 1999
A broad feature of ESDP/ESIP monitoring system development is the relatively little attention being paid to capacity building objectives and changing organisational/management processes, in particular, targets related to strengthening inter-ministerial co-ordination processes (education, finance and planning) are rarely specified. Similarly, targets related to improved regulatory frameworks and mechanisms (e.g. school inspection, school attendance, and dissemination of school effectiveness information) are rarely detailed. In broad terms, there is a need to design and implement a phased and sequenced ESDP/ESIP performance matrix, which sets out intermediate system performance targets and processes. During the design phase in Ghana and Uganda ESDP/ESIP Work Plans were developed in the form of policy matrices (later extended into Task Management tools which currently guides working groups in task identification, timing and action). On this basis, progress and performance can be monitored and evaluated against targets as a part of the process for budget release [Box 42].
In the preparation of action plans for monitoring/evaluation of education SWA, several monitoring issues need to be addressed. Very few of the ESDPs/ESIPs are far enough advanced to examine how far key monitoring issues are being addressed. One concern is whether or not difficult decisions (e.g. teaching service down-sizing) should be front-loaded in order to assess Government commitment. A second issue is whether or not benefit monitoring and evaluation (BME) capacity (including financial monitoring) should be a precondition to embarking on an education SWA. A third issue is whether or not BME operations (often seen as the schools inspectorate) should be re-positioned outside the education ministry, including broader stakeholder representation and audit functions.
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BOX 42 PERFORMANCE BASIS FOR ANNUAL BUDGET RELEASES · Budget and release funds in line with the rolling medium-term expenditure framework, maintaining a minimum agreed percentage of recurrent discretionary expenditure for the education sector over the period 1998-2003. · Extend the rolling medium-term expenditure framework and work plan to cover all development spending (GoU and funding agency) in education, prepare budget, make releases and demonstrate that expenditures have been made in line with the framework and sector Work Plan, without shifting expenditures to development activities outside the three year framework and Work Plan for education. · Convene meetings at regular periods (e.g. every six months) with education funding agencies to review progress reports on the achievement of time bound indicators as set out in the sector programme work plan and the education policy and strategic framework. · Convene meetings annually with relevant education funding agencies to share draft budget submissions and to agree performance indicators (conditions) for budget support, with interim monitoring missions as jointly agreed. |
Source: Education Sector Support Submissions Ghana and Uganda, DFID, 1998
This chapter has argued that as sector wide approaches to education are beginning to shift from planning into implementation, a number of lessons are being learned. They include:
· The importance of national governments owning and leading the SWA process;· The need to include decentralisation, community mobilisation and effective information exchange in the planning stages;
· The need to allow time (up to two or three years) to develop a strategic framework that is based on a long term strategic vision and that is most expedient for the sector;
· The need to build institutional reform and capacity building objectives, targets and processes into the design and planning stages of education SWA;
· Decentralisation, political and managerial, strengthens the operational ability of countries undertaking education SWA;
· Successful SWA implementation depends on there being a robust finance/budget planning system that includes an operational medium term budget framework and active participation in annual Public Expenditure Review exercises;
· The importance of using strengthened education ministry management systems by all stakeholders (implying the avoidance of parallel management structures, the need to develop management capacity building programmes and active adoption of adaptive, participatory, organic management processes and structures);
· An effective education SWA is predicated upon an agreed uncomplicated set of performance indicators and an adequate EMIS and monitoring and evaluation system.
Lastly, there is a historical imperative for adopting sector wide approaches. They were used in support programmes in the 1940's and 1950's, usually following wars and other national disasters. They continue to be used internally by richer countries to manage the key human development sectors of health and education. We conclude, therefore, that it would be inconsistent to argue that a lesser approach is adequate for countries that wish to emerge from the shadow of a more pervasive disaster: overwhelming poverty.
